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1Flashback…to Last Week
• In order to avoid a partial government shutdown, Congress 
must adopt a short-term spending bill by October 1
• Congress manages to complete this job on September 28, 
with just two days to spare.  Lasts until December 9.
• Process is prolonged largely by disagreement between 
Republicans and Democrats about two issues:
» Should funding for the Zika epidemic go to Puerto Rican 
affiliate of Planned Parenthood?
» Should short-term spending bill include funds to address 
lead contamination issues in the water in Flint, MI?
2“This is a serious situation, not a time for partisan politics.
-Sen. Bill Nelson (D-FL)*
*9/13/16; **9/7/16; ***9/7/16; ****9/6/16
“I think they are just being wholly partisan with these endless 
filibusters…The Senate has been blatantly political.”
-Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI)**
“I’m tired of the partisan games being played.”
-Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL)***
“Our colleagues across the aisle will point to partisan excuses, but the 
bottom line is this: There's no excuse not to pass these bills.”
-Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY)****
3
4
5The Onion, 2/27/13
How do party politics shape 
the budget process?
7Outline
• (Short) overview of the budget process
• How is the budget process working?
• How does partisan politics affect the 
process?
• Will the 2016 election matter?
8Source: National Priorities Project
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Budget 
Resolution
Appropriations 
Bills
Source: National Priorities Project
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Metric #1: Passing a Budget Resolution 
(FY1983-2017)
Same Party Controlling Both Houses
Number of Resolutions
Democrats 12
Republicans 11
Overall 23
Percentage Success
Democrats 92%
Republicans 73%
Overall 83%
Different Parties
Number of Resolutions
Democratic Senate 6
Republican Senate 5
Overall 11
Percentage Success
Democratic Senate 17%
Republican Senate 100%
Overall 64%
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Metric #2: Developing Appropriations Bills
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Metric #3: Passing Appropriations Bills
(FY1983-2017)
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Metric #4: Continuing Resolutions
(FY1998-2016)
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Is party conflict to blame?
Yes.
Verdict: Congress regularly 
struggles to complete various 
parts of the budget process on 
time
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Three Ways Party Conflict Can Affect the 
Budget Process
• Intra-party divisions
• Inter-party divisions
• Inter-branch divisions
• Woon and Anderson (2012) and Hanson (2014)
19
Divisions within the majority party
20
Intra-Party Conflict: Appropriations 
Committees
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More appropriations delay when majority party appropriators are 
ideologically different from majority party as a whole (Woon and 
Anderson 2012)
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Divisions between the parties
22
Inter-Party Conflict: Size of Senate Majority
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More omnibus appropriations bills in Senate when Senate majority is 
smaller (Hanson 2014)
23
Inter-Party Conflict: Senate Polarization
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More omnibus appropriations bills in Senate when Senate is more 
polarized (Hanson 2014)
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Divisions between the branches
25
Congress vs. the President
More appropriations delay when Congress and the president are 
ideologically different (Woon and Anderson 2012)
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Budget Process as a “Steam Valve” 
• Intra- and inter-party divisions affect other parts 
of the legislative process too
• Party leaders respond by tightly managing 
legislative process, including restricting 
amendment opportunities
• Less able to do this in the budget process 
27
Budget Process as a “Steam Valve”
“My reaction is it is like a steam kettle. You fire it up, 
and it is going to come out someplace. If Senators 
can freely offer amendments on other measures, 
they may not be as interested in offering 
amendments on the budget resolution. But as long 
as the budget resolution stands almost alone as a 
way for minority members to get votes on things that 
they are very interested in getting votes on, you will 
be a target.”
--former Senate Parliamentarian Bob Dove, 2009
28
Using the Steam Valve: 2015 Confederate Flag 
Debate
• July 2015: House is debating the EPA/Interior 
appropriations bill
• Democrats initially offer an amendment to the bill 
limiting the display of the Confederate flag on 
federal lands; the amendment is adopted
• Republicans respond with an amendment of their 
own that would undo the Democrats’ efforts
• Rather than hold a vote on the contentious issue, 
Republican leaders pull the bill from the floor.
29
Overall Amendments, House of 
Representatives
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Amendments to Appropriations Bills in the 
House
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Amendments to the Senate Budget Resolution
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
4 S
h
a
re
 o
f 
A
ll 
F
ile
d
 A
m
e
n
d
m
e
n
ts
 O
ff
e
re
d
 
(%
)
A
m
e
n
d
m
e
n
ts
 O
ff
e
re
d
 t
o
 B
u
d
g
e
t 
R
e
s
o
lu
ti
o
n
Amendments to Budget Resolution Share of Filed Amendments Offered
32
Will the 2016 Election Matter?
• Some interest in both chambers in budget 
process reform, but little of that is directed at 
procedural components
• Possibility of a smaller House Republican 
majority
• Possibility of a very closely divided Senate
• Unified government wouldn’t be a panacea
